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Abstract
We study the limitations of steganography when the sender is not using any properties of the
underlying channel beyond its entropy and the ability to sample from it. On the negative side,
we show that the number of samples the sender must obtain from the channel is exponential in
the rate of the stegosystem. On the positive side, we present the first secret-key stegosystem
that essentially matches this lower bound regardless of the entropy of the underlying chan-
nel. Furthermore, for high-entropy channels, we present the first secret-key stegosystem that
matches this lower bound statelessly (i.e., without requiring synchronized state between sender
and receiver).
Keywords. steganography, covert communication, rejection sampling, lower bound, pseudo-
randomnness, information hiding, huge random objects.
1 Introduction
Steganography’s goal is to conceal the presence of a secret message within an innocuous-looking
communication. In other words, steganography consists of hiding a secret hiddentext message within
a public covertext to obtain a stegotext in such a way that an unauthorized observer is unable to
distinguish between a covertext with a hiddentext and one without.
The first rigorous complexity-theoretic formulation of secret-key steganography was provided by
Hopper, Langford and von Ahn [11]. In this formulation, steganographic secrecy of a stegosystem is
defined as the inability of a polynomial-time adversary to distinguish between observed distributions
of unaltered covertexts and stegotexts. (This is in contrast with many previous works, which tended
to be information-theoretic in perspective; see, e.g., [4] and other references in [11, 4].)
1.1 Model
In steganography, the very presence of a message must be hidden from the adversary, who must be
given no reason for suspecting that anything is unusual. This is the main difference from encryption,
∗Preliminary version appears in TCC 2005 [5].
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which does not prevent the adversary from suspecting that a secret message is being sent, but only
from decoding the message. To formalize “unusual,” some notion of usual communication must
exist.
We adopt the model of [11] with minor changes. In it, sender sends data to receiver. The usual
(nonsteganographic) communication comes from the channel, which is a distribution of possible
documents sent from sender to receiver based on past communication. The channel models the
sender’s decision process about what to say next in ordinary communication; thus, the sender is
given access to the channel via a sampling oracle that takes the past communication as input and
returns the next document from the appropriate probability distribution. Sender and receiver share
a secret key (public-key steganography is addressed in [18, 1]).
The adversary is assumed to also have some information about the usual communication, and
thus about the channel. It listens to the communication and tries to distinguish the case where
the sender and receiver are just carrying on the usual conversation (equivalently, sender is honestly
sampling from the oracle) from the case where the sender is transmitting a hiddentext message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ (the message may even be chosen by the adversary). A stegosystem is secure if the
adversary’s suspicion is not aroused—i.e., if the two cases cannot be distinguished.
1.2 Desirable Characteristics of a Stegosystem
Black-Box. In order to obtain a stegosystem of broad applicability, one would like to make as
few assumptions as possible about the understanding of the underlying channel. As Hopper et
al. [11] point out, the channel may be very complex and not easily described. For example, if the
parties are using photographs of city scenes as covertexts, it is reasonable to assume that the sender
can obtain such photographs, but unreasonable to expect the sender and the receiver to know a
polynomial-time algorithm that can construct such photographs from uniformly distributed random
strings. We therefore concentrate on black-box steganography, in which the knowledge about the
channel is limited to the sender’s ability to query the sampling oracle and a bound on the channel’s
min-entropy available to sender and receiver. In particular, the receiver is not assumed to be able
to sample from the channel. The adversary, of course, may know more about the channel.
Efficient (in terms of running time, number of samples, rate, reliability). The running
times of sender’s and receiver’s algorithms should be minimized. Affairs are slightly complicated
by the sender’s algorithm, which involves two kinds of fundamentally different operations: compu-
tation, and channel sampling. Because obtaining a channel sample could conceivably be of much
higher cost than performing a computation step, the two should be separately accounted for.
Transmission rate of a stegosystem is the number of hiddentext bits transmitted per single ste-
gotext document sent. Transmission rate is tied to reliability, which is the probability of successful
decoding of an encoded message (and unreliability, which is one minus reliability). The goal is to
construct stegosystems that are reliable and transmit at a high rate (it is easier to transmit at a
high rate if reliability is low and so the receiver will not understand much of what is transmitted).
Even if a stegosystem is black-box, its efficiency may depend on the channel distribution. We
will be interested in the dependence on the channel min-entropy h. Ideally, a stegosystem would
work well even for low-min-entropy channels.
Secure. Insecurity is defined as the adversary’s advantage in distinguishing stegotext from regular
channel communication (and security as one minus insecurity). Note that security, like efficiency,
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may depend on the channel min-entropy. We are interested in stegosystems with insecurity as close
to 0 as possible, ideally even for low-min-entropy channels.
Stateless. It is desirable to construct stateless stegosystems, so that the sender and the receiver
need not maintain synchronized state in order to communicate long messages. Indeed, the need for
synchrony may present a particular problem in steganography in case messages between sender and
receiver are dropped or arrive out of order. Unlike in counter-mode symmetric encryption, where
the counter value can be sent along with the ciphertext in the clear, here this is not possible: the
counter itself would also have to be steganographically encoded to avoid detection, which brings us
back to the original problem of steganographically encoding multibit messages.
1.3 Our Contributions
We study the optimal efficiency achievable by black-box steganography, and present secret-key
stegosystems that are nearly optimal. Specifically, we demonstrate the following results:
• A lower bound, which states that a secure and reliable black-box stegosystem with rate of w
bits per document sent requires the encoder to take at least c2w samples from the channel
per w bits sent, for some constant c. The value of c depends on security and reliability, and
tends to 1/(2e) as security and reliability approach 1. This lower bound applies to secret-key
as well as public-key stegosystems.
• A stateful black-box secret-key stegosystem STF that transmits w bits per document sent,
takes 2w samples per w bits, and has unreliability of 2−h+w per document (recall that h is
the channel entropy) and negligible insecurity, which is independent of the channel. (A very
similar construction was independently discovered by Hopper [12, Construction 6.10].)
• A stateless black-box secret-key stegosystem STL that transmits w bits per document sent,
takes 2w samples per w bits, and has unreliability 2−Θ(2
h) and insecurity negligibly close to
l22−h+2w for lw bits sent.
Note that for both stegosystems, the rate vs. number of samples tradeoff is very close to the
lower bound—in fact, for channels with sufficient entropy, the optimal rate allowed by the lower
bound and the achieved rate differ by log2 2e < 2.5 bits (and some of that seems due to slack in the
bound). Thus, our bound is quite tight, and our stegosystems quite efficient. The proof of the lower
bound involves a surprising application of the huge random objects of [8], specifically of the truthful
implementation of a boolean function with interval-sum queries. The lower bound demonstrates
that significant improvements in stegosystem performance must come from assumptions about the
channel.
The stateless stegosystem STL can be used whenever the underlying channel distribution has
sufficient min-entropy h for the insecurity l22−h+2w to be acceptably low. It is extremely simple,
requiring just evaluations of a pseudorandom function for encoding and decoding, and very reliable.
If the underlying channel does not have sufficient min-entropy, then the stateful stegosystem
STF can be used, because its insecurity is independent of the channel. While it requires shared
synchronized state between sender and receiver, the state information is only a counter of the
number of documents sent so far. If min-entropy of the channel is so low that unreliability of
2−h+w per document is too high for the application, reliability of this stegosystem can be improved
through the use of error-correcting codes over the 2w-ary alphabet (applied to the hiddentext
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before stegoencoding), because failure to decode correctly is independent for each w-bit block.
Error-correcting codes can increase reliability to be negligibly close to 1 at the expense of reducing
the asymptotic rate from w to w− (h+2)2−h+w . Finally, of course, the min-entropy of any channel
can be improved from h to nh by viewing n consecutive samples as a single draw from the channel;
if h is extremely small to begin with, this will be more efficient than using error-correcting codes
(this improvement requires both parties to be synchronized modulo n, which is not a problem in
the stateful case).
This stateful stegosystem STF also admits a few variants. First, the logarithmic amount of
shared state can be eliminated at the expense of adding a linear amount of private state to the
sender and reducing reliability slightly (as further described in 4.1), thus removing the need for
synchronization between the sender and the receiver. Second, under additional assumptions about
the channel (e.g., if each document includes time sent, or has a sequence number), STF can be
made completely stateless. The remarks of this paragraph and the previous one can be equally
applied to [12, Construction 6.10].
1.4 Related Work
The bibliography on the subject of steganography is extensive; we do not review it all here, but
rather recommend references in [11].
Constructions. In addition to introducing the complexity-theoretic model for steganography,
[11] proposed two constructions of black-box1 secret-key stegosystems, called Construction 1 and
Construction 2.
Construction 1 is stateful and, like our stateful construction STF, boasts negligible insecurity
regardless of the channel. However, it can transmit only 1 bit per document, and its reliability is
limited by 1/2+1/4(1−2−h) per document sent, which means that, regardless of the channel, each
hiddentext bit has probability at least 1/4 of arriving incorrectly (thus, to achieve high reliability,
error-correcting codes with expansion factor of at least 1/(1−H2(1/4)) ≈ 5 are needed). In contrast,
STF has reliability that is exponentially (in the min-entropy) close to 1, and thus works well for
any channel with sufficient entropy. Furthermore, it can transmit at rate w for any w < h, provided
that the encoder has sufficient time for the 2w samples required. It can be seen as a generalization
of Construction 1.
Construction 2 of [11] is stateless. Like the security of our stateless construction STL, its security
depends on the min-entropy of the underlying channel. While no exact analysis is provided in [11],
the insecurity of Construction 2 seems to be roughly
√
l2(−h+w)/2 (due to the fact that the adversary
sees l samples either from C or from a known distribution with bias roughly 2(−h+w)/2 caused by
a public extractor; see Appendix A), which is higher than the insecurity of STL (unless l and w
are so high that h < 3w+3 log l, in which case both constructions are essentially insecure, because
insecurity is higher than the inverse of the encoder’s running time l2w). Reliability of Construction
2, while not analyzed in [11], seems close to the reliability of STL. The rate of Construction 2 is
lower (if other parameters are kept the same), due to the need for randomized encryption of the
hiddentext, which necessarily expands the number of bits sent.
It is important to note that the novelty of STL is not the construction itself, but rather its
analysis. Specifically, its stateful variant appeared as Construction 1 in the Extended Abstract of
1Construction 2, which, strictly speaking, is not presented as a black-box construction in [11], can be made
black-box through the use of extractors (such as universal hash functions) in place of unbiased functions, as shown
in [18].
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[11], but the analysis of the Extended Abstract was later found to be flawed by [13]. Thus, the full
version of [11] included a different Construction 1. We simply revive this old construction, make it
stateless, generalize it to w bits per document, and, most importantly, provide a new analysis for
it.
In addition to the two constructions of [11] described above, and independently of our work, Hop-
per [12] proposed two more constructions: Constructions 6.10 (MultiBlock) and 3.15 (NoState).
As already mentioned, MultiBlock is essentially the same as our STF. NoState is an interesting
variation of Construction 1 of [11] that addresses the problem of maintaining shared state at the
expense of lowering the rate even further.
Bounds on the Rate and Efficiency. Hopper in [12, Section 6.2] establishes a bound on the
rate vs. efficiency tradeoff. Though quantitatively similar to ours (in fact, tighter by the constant of
2e), this bound applies only to a restricted class of black-box stegosystems: essentially, stegosystems
that encode and decode one block at a time and sample a fixed number of documents per block.
The bound presented in this paper applies to any black-box stegosystem, as long as it works for a
certain reasonable class of channels, and thus can be seen as a generalization of the bound of [12].
Our proof techniques are quite different than those of [12], and we hope they may be of independent
interest. We refer the reader to Section 3.4 for an elaboration. Finally it should be noted that
non-black-box stegosystems can be much more efficient—see [11, 18, 14, 15].
2 Definitions
2.1 Steganography
The definitions here are essentially those of [11]. We modify them in three ways. First, we view the
channel as producing documents (symbols in some, possibly very large, alphabet) rather than bits.
This simplifies notation and makes min-entropy of the channel more explicit. Second, we consider
stegosystem reliability as a parameter rather than a fixed value. Third, we make the length of the
adversary’s description (and the adversary’s dependence on the channel) explicit in the definition.
The Channel. Let Σ be an alphabet; we call the elements of Σ documents. A channel C is
a map that takes a history H ∈ Σ∗ as input and produces a probability distribution DH ∈
Σ. A history H = s1s2...sn is legal if each subsequent symbol is obtainable given the previ-
ous ones, i.e., PrDs1s2...si−1 [si] > 0. Min-entropy of a distribution D is defined as H∞(D) =
mins∈D{− log2 PrD[s]}. Min-entropy of C is the minHH∞(DH), where the minimum is taken over
legal histories H.
Our stegosystems will make use of a channel sampling oracle M , which, on input H, outputs a
symbol s according to DH. A stegosystem may be designed for a particular Σ and min-entropy of
C.
Definition 1. A black-box secret-key stegosystem for the alphabet Σ is a pair of probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms ST = (SE ,SD) such that, for a security parameter κ,
1. SE has access to a channel sampling oracle M for a channel C on Σ and takes as input
a randomly chosen key K ∈ {0, 1}κ, a string m ∈ {0, 1}∗ (called the hiddentext), and the
channel history H. It returns a string of symbols s1s2 . . . sl ∈ Σ∗ (called the stegotext)
5
2. SD takes as input a key K ∈ {0, 1}κ, a stegotext s1s2 . . . sl ∈ Σ∗, and a channel history H
and returns a hiddentext m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
We further assume that the length l of the stegotext output by SE depends only on the length of
hiddentext m but not on its contents.
Stegosystem Reliability. The reliability of a stegosystem ST with security parameter κ for a
channel C and messages of length µ is defined as
RelST(κ),C,µ = min
m∈{0,1}µ,H
{ Pr
K∈{0,1}κ
[SD(K,SEM (K,m,H),H) = m]} .
Unreliability is defined as UnRelST (κ),C,µ = 1−RelST (κ),C,µ.
The Adversary. We consider only passive adversaries who mount a chosen hiddentext attack on
ST (stronger adversarial models for steganography have also been considered, see, e.g., [11, 18, 1]).
The goal of such an adversary is to distinguish whether it is seeing encodings of the hiddentext it
supplied to the encoder or simply random draws from the channel. To this end, define an oracle
O(·,H) that produces random draws from the channel starting with history H as follows: on input
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, O computes the length l of the stegotext that SEM (K,m) would have output and
outputs s1s2 . . . sl where each si is drawn according to DH◦s1s2...si−1 .
Definition 2. W is a (t, d, q, λ) passive adversary for stegosystem ST if
1. W runs in expected time t (including the running time needed by the stegoencoder to answer
its queries) and has description of length d (in some canonical language).
2. W has access to C via the sampling oracle M(·).
3. W can make an expected number of q queries of combined length λ bits to an oracle which
is either SEM (K, ·, ·) or O(·, ·).
4. W outputs a bit indicating whether it was interacting with SE or with O.
Stegosystem Security. The advantage AdvSS (here SS stands for “Steganographic Secrecy”)
of W against ST with security parameter κ for a channel C is defined as
AdvSS
ST (κ),C(W ) =
∣∣∣∣ PrK←{0,1}κ[WM,SEM (K,·,·) = 1]− Pr[WM,O(·,·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ .
For a given (t, d, q, λ), the insecurity of a stegosystem ST with respect to channel C is defined as
InSecSS
ST (κ),C(t, d, q, λ) = max
(t,d,q,λ) adversary W
{AdvSS
ST (κ),C(W )} ,
and security Sec as 1− InSec.
Note that the adversary’s algorithm can depend on the channel C, subject to the restriction
on the algorithm’s total length d. In other words, the adversary can possess some description of
the channel in addition to the black-box access provided by the channel oracle. This is a mean-
ingful strengthening of the adversary: indeed, it seems imprudent to assume that the adversary’s
knowledge of the channel is limited to whatever is obtainable by black-box queries (for instance,
the adversary has some idea of a reasonable email message or photograph should look like). It does
not contradict our focus on black-box steganography: it is prudent for the honest parties to avoid
relying on particular properties of the channel, while it is perfectly sensible for the adversary, in
trying to break the stegosystem, to take advantage of whatever information about the channel is
available.
6
2.2 Pseudorandom Functions
We use pseudorandom functions [7] as a tool. Because the adversary in our setting has access to the
channel, any cryptographic tool used must be secure even given the information provided by the
channel. Thus, the underlying assumption for our constructions is the existence of pseudorandom
functions that are secure given the channel oracle, which is equivalent [9] to the existence of one-
way functions that are secure given the channel oracle. This is the minimal assumption needed for
steganography [11].
Let F = {Fseed}seed∈{0,1}∗ be a family of functions, all with the same domain and range. For a
probabilistic adversary A, and channel C with sampling oracle M , the PRF-advantage of A over F
is defined as
AdvPRFF(n),C(A) =
∣∣∣∣ Prseed←{0,1}n[AM,Fseed(·) = 1]− Prg [AM,g(·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ,
where g is a random function with the same domain and range. For a given (t, d, q), the insecurity
of a pseudorandom function family F with respect to channel C is defined as
InSecPRFF(n),C(t, d, q) = max
(t,d,q) adversary A
{AdvSSF(n),C(A)} ,
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries that run in expected time t, whose description
size is at most d, and that make an expected number of q queries to their oracles.
The existence of pseudorandom functions is also the underlying assumption for our lower bound;
however, for the lower bound, we do not need to give the adversary access to a channel oracle
(because we construct the channel). To distinguish this weaker assumption, we will omit the
subscript C from InSec.
3 The Lower Bound
Recall that we define the rate of a stegosystem as the average number of hiddentext bits per document
sent (this should not be confused with the average number of hiddentext bits per bit sent; note also
that this is the sender’s rate, not the rate of information actually decoded by the receiver, which is
lower due to unreliability). We set out to prove that a reliable stegosystem with black-box access
to the channel with rate w must make roughly l2w queries to the channel to send a message of
length lw. Intuitively, this should be true because each document carries w bits of information on
average, but since the encoder knows nothing about the channel, it must keep on sampling until it
gets the encoding of those w bits, which amounts to 2w samples on average.
In particular, for the purposes of this lower bound it suffices to consider a restricted class of
channels: the distribution of the sample depends only on the length of the history (not on its
contents). We will write D1,D2, ...,Di, ..., instead of DH, where i is the length of the history H.
Furthermore, it will suffice for us to consider only distributions Di that are uniform on a subset of
Σ. We will use the notation Di both for the distribution and for the subset (as is often done for
uniform distributions).
Let H denote the number of elements of Di (note that H = |Di| = 2h), and let S = |Σ|. Because
the encoder knows the min-entropy h of the channel, if H = S, then the encoder knows the channel
completely (it is simply uniform on Σ). Therefore, if H = S, then there is no meaningful lower
bound on the number of queries made by the encoder to the channel oracle, because it does not
need to make any queries in order to sample from the channel. Thus, we require that H < S (our
bounds will depend slightly on the ratio of S to S −H).
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Our proof proceeds in two parts. First, we consider a stegoencoder SE that does not output
anything that it did not receive as a response from the channel-sampling oracle (intuitively, every
good stegoencoder should work this way, because otherwise it may output something that is not in
the channel, and thus be detected). To be reliable—that is, to find a set of documents that decode
to the desired message—such an encoder has to make many queries, as shown in Lemma 1. Second,
we formalize the intuition that a good stegoencoder should output only documents it received from
the channel-sampling oracle: we show that to be secure (i.e., not output something easily detectable
by the adversary), a black-box SE cannot output anything it did not receive from the oracle: if it
does, it has an 1−H/S chance of being detected.
The second half of the proof is somewhat complicated by the fact that we want to assume
security only against bounded adversaries: namely, ones whose description size and running time
are polynomial in the description size and running time of the encoder (in particular, polynomial
in log S rather than S). Thus, the adversary cannot be detecting a bad stegoenconder by simply
carrying a list of all the entries in Di for each i and checking if the ith document sent by the
stegoencoder is in Di, because that would make the adversary’s description too long.
This requires us to come up with pseudorandom subsets Di of Σ that have concise descriptions
and high min-entropy and whose membership is impossible for the stegoencoder to predict. In
order to do that, we utilize techniques from the truthful implementation of a boolean function
with interval-sum queries of [8] (truthfulness is important, because min-entropy has to be high
unconditionally).
3.1 Lower Bound When Only Query Results Are Output
If D1,D2, . . . are subsets of Σ, then we write ~D = D1 × D2 × . . . to denote the channel that, on
history length i, outputs a uniformly random element of Di. If |D1| = |D2| = . . . = 2h then we say
that ~D is a flat h-channel. We will consider flat h-channels.
Normally, one would think of the channel sampling oracle for ~D as making a fresh random choice
from Di when queried on history length i. However, from the point of view of the stegoencoder, it
does not matter if the choice was made by the oracle in response to the query, or before the query
was even made. It will be easier for us to think of the oracle as having already made and written
down countably many samples from each Di. We will denote the jth sample from Di by si,j. Thus,
suppose that the oracle has already chosen
s1,1, s1,2, . . . , s1,j, . . . from D1,
s2,1, s2,2, . . . , s2,j, . . . from D2,
. . . ,
si,1, si,2, . . . , si,j, . . . from Di,
. . . .
We will denote the string containing all these samples by S and refer to it as a draw sequence from
the channel. We will give our stegoencoder access to an oracle (also denoted by S) that, each time
it is queried with i, returns the next symbol from the sequence si,1, si,2, . . . , si,j, . . .. Choosing S at
random and giving the stegoencoder access to it is equivalent to giving the encoder access to the
usual channel-sampling oracle M for our channel ~D.
Denote the stegoencoder’s output by SES(K,m,H) = t = t1t2 . . . tl, where ti ∈ Σ. Because
we assume in this section that the stegoencoder outputs only documents it got from the channel
oracle, ti is an element of the sequence si,1, si,2, . . . , si,j, . . .. If ti is the jth element of this sequence,
then it took j queries to produce it. We will denote by weight of t with respect to S the number
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of queries it took to produce t: W (t,S) = ∑li=1min{j | si,j = ti}. In the next lemma, we prove
(by looking at the decoder) that for any S most messages have high weight, i.e., must take many
queries to encode.
Lemma 1. Let F : Σ∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an arbitrary (possibly unbounded) deterministic stegodecoder
that takes a sequence t ∈ Σl and outputs a message m of length lw bits.
Then the probability that a random lw-bit message has an encoding of weight significantly less
than (1/e)l2w is small. More precisely, for any S ∈ Σ∗∗ and any N ∈ N:
Pr
m∈{0,1}lw
[(∃t ∈ Σl)(F (t) = m ∧ W (t,S) ≤ N)] ≤
(N
l
)
2lw
<
(
Ne
l2w
)l
.
Proof. Simple combinatorics show that the number of different sequences t that have weight at
most N (and hence the number of messages that have encodings of weight at most N) is at most(N
l
)
: indeed, it is simply the number of positive integer solutions to j1 + . . . + jl ≤ N , which is
the number of ways to put l bars among N − l stars (the number of stars to the right of the ith
bar corresponds to ji − 1), or, equivalently, the number of ways choose l positions out of N . The
total number of messages is 2lw. The last inequality follows from
(N
l
)
<
(
Ne
l
)l
(which is a standard
combinatorics fact and follows from k! ≥ (k/e)k, which in turn follows by induction on k from
e > (1 + 1/k)k).
Our lower bound applies when a stegosystem is used to encode messages drawn uniformly from
bit strings of equal length. It can easily be extended to messages drawn from a uniform distribution
on any set. If the messages are not drawn from a uniform distribution, then, in principle, they can
be compressed before transmission, thus requiring less work on the part of the stegoencoder. We
do not provide a lower bound in such a case, because any such lower bound would depend on the
compressibility of the message source.
3.2 Secure Stegosystems Almost Always Output Query Answers
The next step is to prove that the encoder of a secure black-box stegosystem must output only
what it gets from the oracle, or else it has a high probability of outputting something not in the
channel. Assume that ~D is a flat h-channel chosen uniformly at random. For t = t1 . . . tl ∈ Σ∗,
let t ∈ ~D denote that ti is in Di for each i. In the following lemma, we demonstrate that, if the
encoder’s output t contains a document that it did not receive as a response to a query, the chances
that t ∈ ~D are at most H/S.
Before stating the lemma, we define the set E of all possible flat h-channels and draw sequences
consistent with them: E = {( ~D,S) | si,j ∈ Di}. We will be taking probabilities over E. Strictly
speaking, E is an infinite set, because we defined ~D to be countable and S to have countably
many samples from each Di. For clarity, it may be easiest to think of truncating these countable
sequences to a sufficiently large value beyond which no stegoencoder will ever go, thus making E
finite, and then use the uniform distribution on E. Formally, E can be defined as a product of
countably many discrete probability spaces (see, e.g., [6, Section 9.6]), with uniform distribution
on each.
Lemma 2. Consider any deterministic procedure A that is given oracle access to a random flat
h-channel ~D and outputs t = t1t2 . . . tl ∈ Σ∗ (think of A as the stegoencoder running on some input
key, message, channel history, and fixed randomness). Provided that h is sufficiently smaller than
log S, if A outputs something it did not get from the oracle, then the probability t ∈ ~D is low.
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More precisely, let Qi be the set of responses A received to its queries from the ith channel Di.
Define the following two events:
• nonqueried: Nq = {( ~D,S) ∈ E | (∃i)ti /∈ Qi}
• in support: Ins = {( ~D,S) ∈ E | t ∈ ~D}
Then:
Pr
( ~D,S)∈E
[Ins ∧ Nq ] ≤ H
S
.
Proof. If A were always outputting just a single value (l = 1), the proof would be trivial: seeing
some samples from a random D1 does not help A come up with another value from D1, and D1
makes up only an H/S fraction of all possible outputs of A. The proof below is a generalization
of this argument for l ≥ 1, with care to avoid simply taking the union bound, which would get us
lH/S instead of H/S.
Let Nqi = {( ~D,S) ∈ E | t1 ∈ Q1, t2 ∈ Q2, . . . , ti−1 ∈ Qi−1, ti /∈ Qi} be the event ti is the first
element of the output that was not returned by the oracle as an answer to a query. Observe that⋃
iNq i = Nq and that Nq i are disjoint events and, therefore,
∑
i Pr[Nq i] = 1. Now the probability
we are interested in is
Pr[Ins ∧ Nq] =
∑
i
Pr[Ins ∧ Nq i] =
∑
i
Pr[Ins | Nq i] Pr[Nqi] .
To bound Pr[Ins | Nq i], fix any
S = s1,1, s1,2,. . . , s1,q1 ,
s2,1, s2,2,. . . , s2,q2 ,
. . . ,
such that AS asks exactly q1 queries from D1, q2 queries from D2, . . . . Note that such S determines
the behavior ofA, including its output. Assume that, for this S, the event Nqi happens. We will take
the probability Pr[Ins | Nq i] over a random ~D consistent with S (i.e., for which s1,1, s1,2, . . . s1,q1 ∈
D1, s2,1, s2,2 . . . s2,q2 ∈ D2, . . .). This probability can be computed simply as follows: if q′i is the
number of distinct elements in si,1, si,2, . . . , si,qi, then there are
(S−q′i
H−q′i
)
equally likely choices for Di
(because q′i elements of Di are already determined). However, for Ins to happen, Di must also
contain ti, which is not among si,1, si,2, . . . , si,qi (because we assumed Nq i happens). The choices
of D1, . . . ,Di−1,Di+1, . . . do not matter. Therefore,
Pr[Ins | Nqi] =
(S−q′i−1
H−q′i−1
)
(S−q′i
H−q′i
) = H − q′i
S − q′i
≤ H
S
.
The above probability is for any fixed S of the right length and randomly chosen ~D consistent
with S. Therefore, it also holds for randomly chosen ( ~D,S) ∈ E, because the order in which S and
~D are chosen and the values in S beyond what A queries do not affect the probability. We thus
have
Pr
( ~D,S)∈E
[Ins ∧ Nq ] =
∑
i
Pr[Ins | Nq i] Pr[Nqi] ≤
∑
i
H
S
Pr[Nq i] =
H
S
.
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3.3 Lower Bound for Unbounded Adversary
We now want to tie together Lemmas 1 and 2 to come up with a lower bound on the efficiency of
the stegoencoder in terms of rate, reliability, and security. Note that some work is needed, because
even though Lemma 1 is about reliability and Lemma 2 is about security, neither mentions the
parameters Rel and InSec.
Assume, for now, that the adversary can test whether ti is in the support of Di. (This is not
possible if Di is completely random and the adversary’s description is small compared to S = |Σ|;
however, it serves as a useful warm-up for the next section.) Then, using Lemma 2, it is easily
shown that, if the stegoencoder has insecurity ǫ, then it cannot output something it did not receive
as response to a query with probability higher than ǫ/(1 − H/S). This leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let (SE ,SD) be a black-box stegosystem with insecurity ǫ against an adversary who
has an oracle for testing membership in the support of C, unreliability ρ and rate w for an alphabet Σ
of size S. Then, for any positive integer H < S, there exists a channel with min-entropy h = log2H
such that the probability that the encoder makes at most N queries to send a random message of
length lw is at most (
Ne
l2w
)l
+ ρ+ ǫR ,
and the expected number of queries per stegotext symbol is therefore at least
2w
e
(
1
2
− ρ− ǫR
)
,
where R = S/(S −H).
Note that, like Lemma 1, this theorem and Theorem 2 apply when a stegosystem is used to
encode messages drawn uniformly from the distribution of all lw-bit messages (see remark following
the proof of Lemma 1).
Proof. We define the following events, which are all subsets of E×{0, 1}∗×{0, 1}lw×{0, 1}∗ (below
v denotes the randomness of SE):
• “SE makes few queries to encode m under K”: Few = {~D,S,K,m, v | SES(K,m; v)
makes at most N queries} (note that this is the event whose probability we want to bound)
• “SE outputs a correct encoding ofm underK”: Corr = {~D,S,K,m, v | SD(K,SE S(K,m; v))
= m}
• “m has an encoding t underK, and this encoding has low weight”: Low = {~D,S,K,m, v(∃t) |
SD(K, t) = m ∧ W (t,S) ≤ N}
• Ins and Nq as in Lemma 2, but as subsets of E × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}lw × {0, 1}∗
Suppose that SE outputs a correct encoding of a message m. In that case, the probability that it
made at most N queries to the channel is upper bounded by the probability that: (i) there exists
an encoding of m of weight at most N , or (ii) SE output something it did not query. In other
words,
Pr[Few | Corr ] ≤ Pr[Low | Corr ] + Pr[Nq | Corr ].
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Now we have
Pr[Few ] = Pr[Few ∩ Corr ] + Pr[Few ∩ Corr ]
≤ Pr[Few ∩ Corr ] + Pr[Corr ]
= Pr[Few | Corr ] · Pr[Corr ] + Pr[Corr ]
≤ (Pr[Low | Corr ] + Pr[Nq | Corr ]) · Pr[Corr ] + Pr[Corr ]
= Pr[Low ∩ Corr ] + Pr[Nq ∩ Corr ] + Pr[Corr ]
≤ Pr[Low ] + Pr[Nq ] + Pr[Corr ] .
Because insecurity is ǫ, Pr[Ins ] ≤ ǫ. Hence,
Pr[Nq ] =
Pr[Ins ∩ Nq]
Pr[Ins | Nq] =
Pr[Ins ]
Pr[Ins | Nq] ≤
ǫ
1−H/S (1)
(the second equality follows from the fact that if the encoder outputs something not in ~D, then it
must have not queried it, i.e., Ins ⊆ Nq ; the inequality follows from Lemma 2).
By Lemma 1 we have
Pr[Low ] ≤
(
Ne
l2w
)l
. (2)
Now by combining (1), (2), and the fact that Pr[Corr ] ≤ ρ by reliability, we get that
Pr[Few ] ≤
(
Ne
l2w
)l
+ ρ+
ǫ
1−H/S .
Note that the probability is taken, in particular, over a random choice of ~D. Therefore, it holds
for at least one flat h-channel.
Let random variable q be equal to the number of queries made by SE to encode m under K.
Then, letting d = l2w/e and c = 1− ρ− ǫ1−H/S , we get
E[q] =
∑
N≥0
Pr[q > N ] ≥
⌈d⌉−1∑
N=0
c−
(
N
d
)l
≥
⌈d⌉−1∑
N=0
c− N
d
= c⌈d⌉ − (⌈d⌉ − 1)⌈d⌉
2d
≥
(
c− 1
2
)
⌈d⌉ .
The expected number of queries per document sent is (E[q])/l and so is at least (12−ρ− ǫ1−H/S )(2w/e).
3.4 Lower Bound for Computationally Bounded Parties
We now want to establish the same lower bound without making such a strong assumption about
the security of the stegosystem. Namely, we do not want to assume that the insecurity ǫ is low unless
the adversary’s description size and running time are feasible (“feasible,” when made rigorous, will
mean some fixed polynomial in the description size and running time of the stegoencode and in a
security parameter for a function that is pseudorandom against the stegoencoder). Recall that our
definitions allow the adversary to depend on the channel; thus, our goal is to construct channels
that have short descriptions for the adversary but look like random flat h-channels to the black-box
stegoencoder. In other words, we wish to replace a random flat h-channel with a pseudorandom
one.
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We note that the channel is pseudorandom only in the sense that it has a short description, so as
to allow the adversary to be computationally bounded. The min-entropy guarantee, however, can
not be replaced with a “pseudo-guarantee”: else the encoder is being lied to, and our lower bound
is no longer meaningful. Thus, a simpleminded approach, such as using a pseudorandom predicate
with bias H/S applied to each symbol and history length to determine whether the symbol is in
the support of the channel, will not work here: because S is constant, eventually (for some history
length) the channel will have lower than guaranteed min-entropy (moreover, we do not wish to
assume that S is large in order to demonstrate that this is unlikely to happen; our lower bound
should work for any alphabet). Rather, we need the pseudorandom implementation of the channel
to be truthful2 in the sense of [8], and so rely on the techniques developed therein.
The result is the following theorem, which is similar to Theorem 1, except for a small term
introduced by pseudorandomness of the channel.
Theorem 2. There exist polynomials p1, p2 and constants c1, c2 with the following property. Let
ST (κ) be a black-box stegosystem with security parameter κ, description size δ, unreliability ρ,
rate w, and running time τ for the alphabet Σ = {0, 1, . . . , S − 1}. Assume that there exists
a pseudorandom function family F(n) with insecurity InSecPRFF(n)(t, d, q). Then, for any positive
integer H < S, there exists a channel C with min-entropy h = log2H such that the probability that
the encoder makes at most N queries to send a random message of length lw is upper bounded by
(
Ne
l2w
)l
+ ρ+Rǫ+ (R + 1)
(
InSecPRFF(n)(p1(τ, n), δ + c1, p1(τ, n)) + τ2
−n
)
,
and the expected number of queries per stegotext symbol is therefore at least
2w
e
(
1
2
− ρ−Rǫ− (R + 1)
(
InSecPRFF(n)(p1(τ, n), δ + c1, p1(τ, n)) + τ2
−n
))
,
where R = S/(S−H) and ǫ is the insecurity the stegosystem ST on the channel C against adversaries
running in time p2(n, log S, n) of description size n+ c2, making just one query of length lw to SE
or O (i.e., ǫ = InSecSS
ST (κ),C(p2(n, logS, l), n + c2, 1, lw)).
Proof. The main challenge lies in formulating the analogue of Lemma 2 under computational re-
strictions. Lemma 2 and its use in Theorem 1 relied on: (i) the inability of the encoder to predict
the behavior of the channel (because the channel is random) and (ii) the ability of the adversary
to test if a given string is in the support of the channel (which the adversary has because it is un-
bounded). We need to mimic this in the computationally bounded case. We do so by constructing
a channel whose support (i) appears random to a bounded encoder, but (ii) has an efficient test of
membership that the adversary can perform given only a short advice. As already mentioned, we
wish to replace a random channel with a pseudorandom one and give the short pseudorandom seed
to the adversary, while keeping the min-entropy guarantee truthful.
The next few paragraphs will explain how this is done, using the techniques of huge random
objects from [8]. A reader not familiar with [8] may find it easier to skip to the paragraph entitled
“Properties of the Pseudorandom Flat-h Channels,” where the results of this—i.e., the properties
of the channel that we obtain—are summarized.
2In this case, truthfulness implies that for each history length, the support of the channel has exactly H elements.
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Specifying and Implementing the Flat-h Channel For the next few paragraphs, familiarity
with [8] will be assumed. Recall that [8] requires a specification of the object that will be pseudo-
randomly implemented, in the form of a Turing machine with a countably infinite random tape.
It would be straightforward to specify the channel as a random object (random subset D of Σ of
size H) admitting two types of queries: “sample” and “test membership.” But a pseudorandom
implementation of such an object would also replace random sampling with pseudorandom sam-
pling, whereas in a stegosystem the encoder is guaranteed a truly random sample from D (indeed,
without such a guarantee, the min-entropy guarantee is no longer meaningful). Therefore, we need
to construct a slightly different random object, implement it pseudorandomly, and add random
sampling on top of it. We specify the random object as follows. Recall that S = |Σ|, h is the
min-entropy, and H = 2h.
Definition 3 (Specification of a flat h-channel). Let Mω be a probabilistic Turing machine with
an infinite random tape ω. On input five integers (S,H, i, a, b), (where 0 < H ≤ S, i > 0,
0 ≤ a ≤ b < S), Mω does the following:
• divides ω into consecutive substrings y1, y2, . . . of length S each;
• identifies among them the substrings that have exactly H ones; let y be the ith such substring
(with probability one, there are infinitely many such substrings, of course);
• returns the number of ones in y between, and including, positions a and b in y (positions are
counted from 0 to S − 1).
In what way doesM =Mω specify a flat h-channel? To see that, identify Σ with {0, . . . , S−1},
and let Di be the subset of Σ indicated by the ones in y. Then Di has cardinality H and testing
membership in Di can be realized using a single query to M :
insuppM(i, s):
return M(S,H, i, s, s)
Obviously, Di are selected uniformly at random and independently of each other. Thus, this object
specifies the correct channel and allows membership testing.
We now use this object to allow for random sampling of Di. Outputting a random element of
Di can be realized via log S queries toM , using the following procedure (essentially, binary search):
rndeltM(i):
return random-element-in-rangeM(S,H, i, 0, S − 1)
random-element-in-rangeM(S,H, i, a, b):
if a = b then return a and terminate
mid ← ⌊(a+ b)/2⌋
total ←M(S,H, i, a, b)
left ←M(S,H, i, a,mid )
r
R← {1, . . . , total}
if r ≤ left then
random-element-in-rangeM(S,H, i, a,mid)
else
random-element-in-rangeM(S,H, i,mid + 1, b)
14
We can implement this random object pseudorandomly using the same techniques as [8] uses
for implementing random boolean functions with interval sums (see [8, Theorem 3.2]). Namely,
the authors of [8] give a construction of a truthful pseudo-implementation of a random object
determined by a random boolean function f : {0, . . . , 2n − 1} → {0, 1} that accepts queries in
the form of two n-bit integers (a, b) and answers with
∑b
j=a f(j). Roughly, their construction
is as follows. Let S = 2n. Imagine a full binary tree of depth n, whose leaves contain values
f(0), f(1), . . . , f(S−1). Any other node in the tree contains the sum of leaves in its subtree. Given
access to such tree, we can compute any sum f(a) + f(a + 1) + . . . + f(b) in time proportional
to n. Moreover, such trees need not be stored fully but can be evaluated dynamically, from the
root down to the leaves, as follows. The value in the root (i.e., the sum of all leaves) has binomial
distribution and can be filled in pseudorandomly. Other nodes have more complex distributions
but can be also filled in pseudorandomly and consistently, so that they contain the sums of their
leaves. The construction uses a pseudorandom function to come up with the value at each node.
We need to make three modifications. First, we simply fix the value in the root to H, so that
f(0) + f(1) + . . . + f(S − 1) = H. Second, we allow S to be not a power of 2. Third, in order to
create multiple distributions Di, we add i as an input to the pseudorandom function, thus getting
different (and independent-looking) randomness for each Di.
Having made these modifications, we obtain a truthful pseudo-implementation of M . It can be
used within insupp and rndelt instead of M , for efficient membership testing and truly random
sampling from our pseudorandom channel.
Properties of the Pseudorandom Flat h-Channels We thus obtain that, given a short
random seed ω, it is possible to create a flat h-channel that is indistinguishable from random and
allows for efficient membership testing and truly random sampling given ω. To emphasize the
pseudorandomness of the channel, in our notation we will use DPR insted of D and keep the seed
ω explicit as a supercript. Thus, DPRωi is a pseudorandom subset of Σ of size H, and the channel
is denoted by
−−−→
DPR
ω
= DPRω1 ×DPRω2 × . . .. Similarly to E defined in Section 3.2 for truly random
channels, define EPRn = {(ω,S) | |ω| = n, si,j ∈ DPRωi }.
Because
−−−→
DPR
ω
has the requisite min-entropy, it is valid to expect proper performance of the
stegoencoder on it; because it is pseudorandom, an analog of Lemma 2 will still hold; and because
it has efficient membership testing given a short seed, the adversary will be able to see if an output
of the stegoencoder is not from it.
We are now ready to formally state the claim about the properties of
−−−→
DPR. For this claim,
and for the rest of the proof, we assume existence of a family of pseudorandom functions F with
insecurity InSecPRFF(n)(t, d, q) (recall that InSec is a bound on the distinguishing advantage of any
adversary running in time at most t of description size at most d making at most q queries). To
simplify the notation, we will note that for us d always will be at most description size of the
stegosystem plus some constant c1, and that q ≤ t. We will then write ιPRF (n, t) instead of
InSecPRFF(n)(t, d, q).
Claim 1. There is a polynomial p and a family of channels
−−−→
DPR
ω
, indexed by a string ω of length
n (as well as values H and S), such that, for any positive integers n, i and H ≤ S, channel −−−→DPR
has the following properties:
• is a flat h-channel for h = logH on the alphabet {0, . . . , S − 1};
• allows for sampling and membership testing in time polynomial in n, logS, and log i given
ω, i,H, and S as inputs;
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• is pseudorandom in the following sense: for any H, S, and any oracle machine (distinguisher)
A with running time τ ≥ log S,∣∣∣∣∣ Pr( ~D,S)←E[AS,Memb(~D)() = 1]− Pr(ω,S)←EPRn[AS,Memb(ω)() = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ < ιPRF (n, p(τ, n)) + τ2−n ,
where Memb( ~D) and Memb(ω) denote membership testing oracles for ~D and
−−−→
DPR
ω
, respec-
tively.
The claim follows from the results of [8] with minor modifications, as presented above. We
present no proof here.
Note that the second argument to ιPRF depends on S only to the extent τ does; this is important,
because, even for large alphabets and high-entropy channels, we want to keep the second argument
to ιPRF as low a possible so that ιPRF is as low as possible.
Stegosystems Running with DPR Almost Always Output Query Answers Having built
pseudorandom channels, we now state the analog of Lemma 2 that works for stegosystems secure
only against bounded adversaries. Fix some H and S. Let A be the same as in Lemma 2, but given
access to
−−−→
DPR
ω
instead of ~D, and let t = t1 . . . tl be its output and Qi be the set of responses A
received to its queries of the ith channel DPRi. Analogously to Nq and Ins , define the following
two families of events, indexed by n, the security parameter for the PRF.
• nonqueried, pseudorandom version: NqPRn = {(ω,S) ∈ EPRn | (∃i)ti /∈ Qi}
• in support, pseudorandom version: InsPRn = {(ω,S) ∈ EPRn | t ∈ −−−→DPRω}
We show that high probability of InsPRn implies low probability of NqPRn. Formal statement
of the lemma follows. To simplify the notation, let R = S/(S −H).
Lemma 3. There exists a polynomial p1 such that, for any A running in time τ ≥ log S, if
Pr[InsPRn] < ǫ(n), then
Pr[NqPRn] < Rǫ(n) + (R+ 1)(ιPRF (n, p1(τ, n)) + τ2
−n) .
Proof. Let Ins and Nq be the same as in Lemma 2. Let A′ be a machine that is given an oracle
which tests membership in the channel. Let A′ run A to get t and output 1 if and only if the
membership oracle says that t is in the channel. Applying Claim 1 to A′, we have that for some
polynomial p′ (namely, the polynomial p(τ + tA′(τ), n), where tA′ is the extra time that A
′ needs
to run after A is finished),
|Pr[InsPRn]− Pr[Ins ]| < ιPRF (n, p′(τ, n)) + τ2−n.
Therefore Pr[Ins ] < ǫ(n) + ιPRF (n, p(τ + p
′(τ, n))) + τ2−n. It now follows, by the same derivation
as for Equation (1) in the proof of Theorem 1, that
Pr[Nq ] <
ǫ(n) + ιPRF (n, p
′(τ, n)) + τ2−n
1−H/S .
Let A′′ be a machine that runs A and outputs 1 if and only if A outputs something it did not
receive as a query response. Applying Claim 1 to A′′, we get that, for some polynomial p′′ (namely,
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the polynomial p(τ + tA′′(τ), n), where tA′′ is the extra time that A
′′ needs to run in addition to
A), we get |Pr[NqPRn]− Pr[Nq ]| < ιPRF (n, p′′(τ, n)) + τ2−n. Therefore,
Pr[NqPRn] <
ǫ(n) + ιPRF (n, p
′(τ, n))
1−H/S + ιPRF (n, p
′′(τ, n)) + (1 +R)τ2−n .
Now let p1 ≥ max(p′, p′′).
Completing the Proof. We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. We define the same events as
in the proof of Theorem 1, except as subsets of EPRn × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}lw × {0, 1}∗ rather than
E×{0, 1}∗×{0, 1}lw×{0, 1}∗ (we use the suffix PR to emphasize that they are for the pseudorandom
channel): FewPRn,CorrPRn,LowPRn denote, respectively, that SE made at most N queries, that
SD correctly decoded the hiddentext, and that the hiddentext has a low-weight encoding.
Just like in the proof of 1, it holds that Pr[FewPRn] ≤ Pr[LowPRn]+Pr[NqPRn]+Pr[CorrPRn]
and that Pr[CorrPRn] < ρ and Pr[LowPRn] < (Ne/l2
w)l. It is left to argue a bound on Pr[NqPRn].
Consider an adversary against our stegosystem that contains ω as part of its description, gives its
oracle a random message to encode, and then tests if the output is in
−−−→
DPR
ω
. It can be implemented
to run in p2(n, logS, l) steps for some polynomial p2 and has description size n + c2 for some
constant c2. Hence, its probability of detecting a stegoencoder output that is not in
−−−→
DPR
ω
cannot
be more than the insecurity ǫ = InSecSS
ST (κ),
−−−→
DPR
ω(p2(n, log S, l), n + c2, 1, lw). In other words,
Pr[InsPRn] ≤ ǫ, and, by Lemma 3, we get
Pr[NqPRn] ≤ Rǫ+ (R+ 1)(ιPRF (n, p1(τ, n)) + τ2−n) .
Finally, to compute a bound on the expected value, we apply the same method as in the proof
of Theorem 1.
Discussion. The proof of Theorem 2 relies fundamentally on Theorem 1: specifically, Lemma 3
relies on Lemma 2. In other words, to prove a lower bound in the computationally bounded setting,
we use the corresponding lower bound in the information-theoretic setting. To do so, we replace an
object of an exponentially large size (the channel) with one that can be succinctly described. This
replacement substitutes some information-theoretic properties with their computational counter-
parts. However, for a lower bound to remain “honest” (i.e., not restricted to uninteresting channels),
some global properties must remain information-theoretic. This is where the truthfulness of huge
random objects of [8] comes to the rescue. We hope that other interesting impossibility results
can be proved in a similar fashion by adapting an information-theoretic result using the paradigm
of [8]. We think truthfulness of the objects will be important in such adaptations for the same
reason it was important here.
Note that the gap in the capabilities of the adversary and encoder/decoder is different in the
two settings: in the information-theoretic case, the adversary is given unrestricted computational
power, while in the computationally bounded case, it is assumed to run in polynomial time but is
given the secret channel seed. However, in the information-theoretic case, we may remove the gap
altogether by providing both the adversary and the encoder/decoder with a channel membership
oracle and still obtain a lower bound analogous3 to that of Theorem 2. We see no such opportunity
3A lower bound on the number of samples per document sent becomes trivially zero if the encoder is given as
much time as it pleases, in addition to the membership oracle of the flat channel. Yet it should not be difficult to
prove that it must then run for O(2w) steps per document sent.
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to remove the gap in the computationally bounded case (e.g., equipping the encoder/decoder with
the channel seed seems to break our proof). Removing this asymmetry in the computationally
bounded case seems challenging and worth pursuing.
4 The Stateful Construction STF
The construction STF relies on a pseudorandom function family F . In addition to the security
parameter κ (the length of the PRF key K), it depends on the rate parameter w. Because it is
stateful, both encoder and decoder take a counter ctr as input.
Our encoder is similar to the rejection-sampler-based encoder of [11] generalized to w bits:
it simply samples elements from the channel until the pseudorandom function evaluated on the
element produces the w-bit symbol being encoded. The crucial difference of our construction is
the following: to avoid introducing bias into the channel, if the same element is sampled twice, the
encoder simply flips a random coin to decide whether to output that element with probability 2−w.
Hopper [12, Construction 6.10] independently proposes a similar construction, except instead of
flipping a fresh random coin, the encoder evaluates the pseudorandom function on a new counter
value (there is a separate counter associated to each sampled document, indicating how many times
the document has been sampled), thus conserving randomness.
Observe that, assuming F is truly random rather than pseudorandom, each sample from the
channel has probability 2−w of being output, independent of anything else, because each time
fresh randomness is being used. Of course, this introduces unreliability, which is related to the
probability of drawing the same element from DH twice.
Procedure STF.SE (K,w,m,H, ctr ):
Let m = m1m2 . . . ml, where |mi| = w
for i← 1 to l:
j ← 0; f ← 0; ctr ← ctr + 1
repeat :
j ← j + 1
si,j ←M(H)
if ∃j′ < j s.t. si,j = si,j′
let c ∈R {0, 1}w
if c = mi then f ← 1
else if FK(ctr , si,j) = mi
then f ← 1
until f = 1
si ← si,j; H ← H||si
output s = s1s2 . . . sl
Procedure STF.SD(K,w, s, ctr ):
Let s = s1 . . . sl, where si ∈ Σ
for i = 1 to l
ctr ← ctr + 1
mi ← FK(ctr , si)
output m = m1m2 · · ·ml
Theorem 3. The stegosystem STF has insecurity InSecSSSTF(κ,w)(t, d, l, lw) = InSec
PRF
F(κ)(t+O(1),
d + O(1), l2w). For each i, the probability that si is decoded incorrectly is 2
−h+w + InSecPRFF(κ)(2
w,
O(1), 2w), and unreliability is at most l(2−h+w + InSecPRFF(κ)(2
w, O(1), 2w)).
Proof. Insecurity bound is apparent from the fact that if F were truly random, then the system
would be perfectly secure, because its output is distributed identically to C (simply because the
encoder samples from the channel and independently at random decides which sample to output,
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because the random function is never applied more than once to the same input). Hence, any
adversary for the stegosystem would distinguish F from random.
The reliability bound per symbol can be demonstrated as follows. Assuming that F is random,
the probability that f becomes 1 after j iterations of the inner loop in STF.SE (i.e., that si = si,j)
is (1 − 2−w)j−12−w. If that happens, the probability that ∃j′ < j such that si,j = si,j′ is at most
(j − 1)2−h. Summing up and using standard formulas for geometric series, we get
∞∑
j=1
(j − 1)2−h (1− 2−w)j−1 2−w = 2−h−w ∞∑
j=1
((
1− 2−w)j
(
∞∑
k=0
(1− 2−w)k
))
< 2w−h.
Note that errors are independent for each symbol, and hence error-correcting codes over alphabet
of size 2w can be used to increase reliability: one simply encodes m before feeding it to SE . Observe
that, for a truly random F , if an error occurs in position i, the symbol decoded is uniformly
distributed among all elements of {0, 1}w − {mi}. Therefore, the stegosystem creates a 2w-ary
symmetric channel with error probability 2w−h(1 − 2−w) = 2−h(2w − 1) (this comes from more
careful summation in the above proof). Its capacity is w −H[1 − 2−h(2w − 1), 2−h, 2−h, . . . , 2−h]
(whereH is Shannon entropy of a distribution) [16, p. 58]. This is equal to w+(2w−1)2−h log 2−h+
(1− 2−h(2w − 1)) log(1− 2−h(2w − 1)). Assuming that the error probability 2−h(2w − 1) ≤ 1/2 and
using log(1 − x) ≥ −2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, we get that the capacity of the channel created by the
encoder is at least w+2−h(2w − 1)(−h− 2) ≥ w− (h+2)2−h+w. Thus, as l grows, we can achieve
rates close to w − (h+ 2)2−h+w with near perfect security and reliability (independent of h).
4.1 Stateless Variants of STF
Our stegosystem STF is stateful because we need F to take ctr as input to make sure we never apply
the pseudorandom function more than once to the same input. This will happen automatically,
without the need for ctr , if the channel C has the following property: for any histories H and
H′ such that H is the prefix of H′, the supports of DH and DH′ do not intersect. For instance,
when documents have monotonically increasing sequence numbers or timestamps, no shared state
is needed.
To remove the need for shared state for all channels, we can do the following. We remove
ctr as an input to F and instead provide STF.SE with the set Q of all values received so far as
answers from M . We replace the line “if ∃j′ < j s.t. si,j = si,j′” with “if si,j ∈ Q” and add the
line “Q ← Q ∪ {si,j}” before the end of the inner loop. Now shared state is no longer needed for
security, because we again get fresh coins on each draw from the channel, even if it collides with a
draw made for a previous hiddentext symbol. However, reliability suffers, because the larger l is,
the more likely a collision will happen. A careful analysis, omitted here, shows that unreliability is
l22−h+w (plus the insecurity of the PRF).
Unfortunately, this variant requires the encoder to store the setQ of all the symbols ever sampled
from C. Thus, while it removes shared state, it requires a lot of private state. This storage can be
reduced somewhat by use of Bloom filters [2] at the expense of introducing potential false collisions
and thus further decreasing reliability. An analysis utilizing the bounds of [3] (omitted here) shows
that using a Bloom filter with (h−w− log l)/ ln 2 bits per entry will increase unreliability by only
a factor of 2, while potentially reducing storage significantly (because the symbols of Σ require at
least h bits to store and possibly more if the DH is sparse).
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5 The Stateless Construction STL
The stateless construction STL is simply STF without the counter and collision detection (and is a
generalization to rate w of the construction that appeared in the extended abstract of [11]). Again,
we emphasize that the novelty is not in the construction but in the analysis. The construction
requires a reliability parameter k to make sure that expected running time of the encoder does not
become infinite due a low-probability event of infinite running time.
Procedure STL.SE (K,w, k,m,H):
Let m = m1 . . . ml, where |mi| = w
for i← 1 to l:
j ← 0
repeat :
j ← j + 1
si,j ←M(H)
until FK(si,j) = mi or j = k
si ← si,j; H ← H||si
output s = s1s2 . . . sl
Procedure STL.SD(K,w, s):
Let s = s1 . . . sl, where si ∈ Σ
for i = 1 to l
mi ← FK(si)
output m = m1m2 · · ·ml
Theorem 4. The stegosystem STL has insecurity
InSecSSSTL(κ,w,k),C(t, d, l, lw) ∈ O(2−h+2wl2 + le−k/2
w
) + InSecPRFF(κ)(t+O(1), d +O(1), l2
w) .
More precisely,
InSecSSSTL(κ,w,k),C(t, d, l, lw) <
2−h
(
l(l + 1)22w − l(l + 3)2w + 2l)+ 2l(1− 1
2w
)k
+ InSecPRFF(κ)(t+ 1, d +O(1), l2
w).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 consists of a hybrid argument. The first step in the hybrid argument
is to replace the stegoencoder SE with SE 1, which is the same as SE , except that it uses a
truly random G instead of pseudorandom F , which accounts for the term InSecPRFF(κ)(t+O(1), d+
O(1), l2w). Then, rather than consider directly the statistical difference between C and the output
of SE 1 on an lw-bit message, we bound it via a series of steps involving related stegoencoders (these
are not encoders in the sense defined in Section 2, as they do not have corresponding decoders;
they are simply related procedures that help in the proof).
The encoders SE 2, SE 3, and SE4 are specified in Figure 1. SE2 is the same as SE 1, except that
it maintains a set Q of all answers received from M so far. After receiving an answer si,j ←M(H),
it checks if si,j ∈ Q; if so, it aborts and outputs “Fail”; else, it adds si,j to Q. It also aborts
and outputs “Fail” if j ever reaches k during an execution of the inner loop. SE 3 is the same as
SE 2, except that instead of thinking of random function G as being fixed before hand, it creates
G “on the fly” by repeatedly flipping coins to decide the w-bit value assigned to si,j. Since, like
SE 2, it aborts whenever a collision between strings of covertexts occurs, the function will remain
consistent. Finally, SE 4 is the same as SE 3, except that it never aborts with failure.
In a sequence of lemmas, we bound the statistical difference between the outputs of SE 1 and
SE 2; show that it is the same as the statistical difference between the outputs of SE 3 and SE4;
and show that the outputs of SE2 and SE 3 are distributed identically. Finally, observe that SE 4
does nothing more than sample from the channel and then randomly and obliviously to the sample
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SE2(K,w, k,m1 . . .ml,H):
Q← ∅
for i← 1 to l:
j ← 0
repeat :
j ← j + 1
si,j ←M(H)
if si,j ∈ Q or j = k + 1 then
abort and output ”Fail”
Q← Q ∪ {si,j}
until G(si,j) = mi
si ← si,j ; H ← H||si
output s = s1s2 . . . sl
SE3(K,w, k,m1 . . .ml,H):
Q← ∅
for i← 1 to l:
j ← 0
repeat :
j ← j + 1
si,j ←M(H)
if si,j ∈ Q or j = k + 1 then
abort and output ”Fail”
Q← Q ∪ {si,j}
Pick c ∈R {0, 1}w
until c = mi
si ← si,j ; H ← H||si
output s = s1s2 . . . sl
SE4(K,w, k,m1 . . .ml,H):
for i← 1 to l:
j ← 0
repeat :
j ← j + 1
si,j ←M(H)
Pick c ∈R {0, 1}w
until c = mi
si ← si,j ; H ← H||si
output s = s1s2 . . . sl
Figure 1: “Encoders” SE 2, SE3, and SE 4 used in the proof of Theorem 4
keep or discard it. Hence, its output is distributed identically to the channel. The details of the
proof follow.
For ease of notation, we will denote 2−h (the upper bound on the probability of elements of
DH) by p and 2
w by R for the rest of this proof.
The following proposition serves as a warm-up for the proof of Lemma 4, which follows it.
Proposition 1. The statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 1 and SE 2 for a
w-bit hiddentext message m ∈ {0, 1}w is at most 2p/(R − 1)2 + 2e−k/R.That is,∑
∀s∈Σ
∣∣∣∣ PrG,M[SE 1(K,w, k,m,H) → s]− PrG,M[SE 2(K,w, k,m,H) → s]
∣∣∣∣
< 2p(R− 1)2 + 2e−k/R .
Proof. Consider the probability that SE2 outputs “Fail” while trying to encode some m ∈ {0, 1}w .
This happens for one of two reasons. First, if after k attempts to find si,j such that G(si,j) = mi,
no such si,j has been drawn. Second, if the same value is returned twice by M before SE 2 finds
a satisfactory si,j; in other words, if there has been a collision between two unsuccessful covertext
documents.
Let E1 denote the event that one of these two situations has occurred and n1 denote the value
of j at which E1 occurs. Then
Pr[E1] ≤
(
R− 1
R
)2
p+
(
R− 1
R
)3
2p+ · · ·+
(
R− 1
R
)k−1
(k − 2)p +
(
R− 1
R
)k
= p
k−1∑
n1=2
(
R− 1
R
)n1
(n1 − 1) +
(
R− 1
R
)k
< p
(
R− 1
R
)2 ∞∑
n1=0
(
R− 1
R
)n1
(n1 + 1) +
(
R− 1
R
)k
= p(R− 1)2 +
(
R− 1
R
)k
< p(R− 1)2 + e−k/R .
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Observe that the probability that SE 2 outputs a specific document s which is not “Fail” can
be only less than the probability that SE1 outputs the same element. Since the total decrease over
all such s is at most the probability of failure from above, the total statistical difference is at most
2Pr[E1].
Lemma 4. The statistical difference between the output of SE1 and SE2 when encoding a message
m ∈ {0, 1}lw is at most
p
(
l(l + 1)R2 − l(l + 3)R + 2l) + 2l(1− 1
R
)k
.
Proof. Proposition 1 deals with the case l = 1. It remains to extend this line of analysis to the
general case l > 1. As in the proof of Proposition 1, let Ei denote the event that SE2 outputs
“Fail” while attempting to encode the ith block of mi. Note that Ei grows with i because the set
Q grows as more and more blocks are encoded. Also, let ni denote the number of attempts used
by SE 2 to encode the ith block. To simplify the analysis, we initially ignore the boundary case of
failure on attempt ni = k and treat a failure on this attempt like all others. Let E
′
i denote these
events. Then, we have the following sequence of probabilities.
Recall that, for E′1,
Pr[E′1] < p(R− 1)2 .
In the harder case of E′2,
Pr[E′2] =
k∑
n1=1
Pr[E′2|n1 draws for bit 1] Pr[n1 draws for bit 1]
≤ p
R
k∑
n1=1
k∑
n2=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1+n2−1
(n1 + n2 − 1)
=
p
R
k∑
n1=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1−1( k∑
n2=1
(
R− 1
R
)n2
(n2 − 1) + n1
k∑
n2=1
(
R− 1
R
)n2)
<
p
R
k∑
n1=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1−1 (
Pr[E′1]/p+ n1(R− 1)
)
<
p
R
(
RPr[E′1]/p +R
2(R− 1))
= p
(
(R− 1)2 +R(R− 1))
= p(2R − 1)(R − 1) .
Similarly, for E′3,
Pr[E′3] ≤
p
R2
k∑
n1=1
k∑
n2=1
k∑
n3=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1+n2+n3−2
(n1 + n2 + n3 − 1)
=
p
R2
k∑
n1=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1−1(
RPr[E′2]/p+ n1
k∑
n2=1
(
R− 1
R
)n2−1 k∑
n3=1
(
R− 1
R
)n3)
<
p
R2
k∑
n1=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1−1 (
RPr[E′2]/p + n1R(R− 1)
)
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<
p
R2
(
R2 Pr[E′2]/p +R
3(R− 1))
= p(3R− 1)(R − 1) .
In general, for E′i, we have the recurrence
Pr[E′i] ≤
p
Ri−1
k∑
n1=1
(
R− 1
R
)n1−1 (
Ri−2 Pr[E′2]/p + n1R
i−2(R− 1))
< Pr[E′i−1] + pR(R− 1) ,
which when solved yields
Pr[E′i] < p(iR − 1)(R − 1) .
Now summing up the probability of failure for each of the w-bit blocks of hiddentext gives
l∑
i=1
Pr[E′i] < p(R− 1)
l∑
i=1
(iR − 1)
= p(R− 1)
(
R
l∑
i=1
i−
l∑
i=1
1
)
= p(R− 1)
(
Rl(l + 1)
2
− l
)
= p
((
R2
2
)
(l + 1)l −
(
R
2
)
(l + 3)l + l
)
.
Next, we compute the probability of the event that the encoding of block mi fails because there
were k unsuccessful attempts to find a string of n covertexts which evaluates to mi under G, given
that no collisions occurred so far. Call this event Eˆi. Then
Pr[Eˆi] <
(
R− 1
R
)k
:
Finally, we compute the total probability of failure which is at most the sum of the E′i and Eˆi
events. That is, the probability that SE2 outputs “Fail” while encoding any of the l w-bit blocks
of mi of m is at most
l∑
i=1
Pr[Ei] <
l∑
i=1
Pr[E′i] + Pr[Eˆi]
< p
((
R2
2
)
(l + 1)l −
(
R
2
)
(l + 3)l + l
)
+ l
(
R− 1
R
)k
.
The statistical difference is at most just twice this amount.
Lemma 5. The statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 2 and SE 3 for a random
function G and hiddentext message m ∈ {0, 1}lw is zero.
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Proof. Both SE 2 and SE3 abort and output “Fail” whenever the encoding a block mi fails. This
occurs because either: (1) there are k unsuccessful attempts to find si,j such that G(si,j) = mi;
or (2) the same document is drawn twice, i.e., there is a collision between candidate covertext
documents. Hence, SE 2 evaluates G at most once on each element of Σ. So, although SE 3 ignores
G and creates its own random function by flipping coins at each evaluation, since no element of Σ
will be re-assigned a new value, the output distributions of SE2 and SE 3 are identical.
Lemma 6. The statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 3 and SE 4 is equal to
the statistical difference between the output distributions of SE1 and SE 2 used to encode the same
message.
Proof. As Lemma 4 shows, the probability that SE 2 (and consequently SE 3 by Lemma 5) outputs
“Fail” is at most ((
R2
2
)
(l + 1)l −
(
R
2
)
(l + 3)l + l
)
+ l
(
R− 1
R
)k
.
Note that SE 4 has no such element; the probabilities of each output other that “Fail” can only
increase. Hence, the total statistical difference is twice the probability of “Fail.”
These three Lemmas, put together, conclude the proof of the Theorem. We can save a factor
of two in the statistical difference by the following observation. Half of the statistical difference
between the outputs of SE 1 and SE 2, as well as between the outputs of SE 3 and SE 4, is due to the
probability of “Fail”. Because neither SE 1 nor SE 4 output “Fail,” the statistical difference between
the distributions they produce is therefore only half of the sum of the statistical differences.
Theorem 5. The stegosystem STL has unreliability
UnRelSSSTL(κ,w,k),C,l ≤ l
(
2w exp
[
−2h−2w−1
]
+ exp
[−2−w−1k])+ InSecPRFF(κ)(t, d, l2w) ,
where t and d are the expected running time and description size, respectively, of the stegoencoder
and the stegodecoder combined.
Proof. As usual, we consider unreliability if the encoder is using a truly random G; then, for a
pseudorandom F , the encoder and decoder will act as a distinguisher for F (because whether
something was encoded correctly can be easily tested by the decoder), which accounts for the
InSecPRF term.
The stegoencoder fails to encode properly when it cannot find si,j such that G(si,j) = mi after
k attempts. We will consider separately the case where G is simply unlikely to hit mi and where
G is reasonably likely to hit mi, but the samples from the channel are just unlucky for k times in
a row.
To bound the probability of failure in the first case, fix some channel historyH and w-bit message
m and consider the probability over G that G(DH) is so skewed that the weight of G
−1(m) in DH
is less c2−w for some constant c < 1 (note that the expected weight is 2−w). Formally, consider
PrG[Prs←DH [G(s) = m] < c2
−w]. Let Σ = {s1 . . . sn} be the alphabet, and let PrDH [si] = pi.
Define the random variable Xi as Xi = 0 if G(si) = m and Xi = pi otherwise. Then the weight
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of G−1(m) equals Prs←DH[G(s) = m] = 1 −
∑n
i=1Xi. Note that the expected value, over G, of∑n
i=1Xi is 1− 2−w. Using Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 2 of [10]), we obtain
Pr
G
[1−
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ c2−w] ≤ exp
[
−2(1− c)22−2w/
n∑
i=1
p2i
]
≤ exp
[
−2(1− c)22−2w/2−h/
n∑
i=1
pi
]
= exp
[
−2(1− c)22h−2w
]
,
where the second to last step follows from pi ≤ 2−h and the last step follows from
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.
If we now set c = 1/2 and take the union bound over all messages m ∈ {0, 1}w , we get that the
probability that G is skewed for at least one message is at most 2w exp
[−2h−2w−1].
To bound the probability of failure in the second case, assume that G(DH) is not so skewed.
Then the probability of failure is
(1− c2−w)k ≤ exp [−c2−wk] .
The result follows from setting c = 1/2 and taking the union bound over l.
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A On Using Public ε-Biased Functions
Many stegosystems [11, 18, 1] (particularly public-key ones) use the following approach: they en-
crypt the hiddentext using encryption that is indistinguishable from random and then use rejection
sampling with a public function f : Σ→ {0, 1}w to stegoencode the resulting ciphertext.
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For security, f should have small bias on DH: i.e., for every c ∈ {0, 1}w , Prs∈DH [s ∈ f−1(c)]
should be close to 2−w. It is commonly suggested that a universal hash function with a published
seed (e.g., as part of the public key) be used for f .
Assume that the stegosystem has to work with a memoryless channel C, i.e., one for which the
distribution D is the same regardless of history. Let E be the distribution induced on Σ by the
following process: choose a random c ∈ {0, 1}w and then keep choosing s ∈ D until f(s) = c. Note
that the statistical difference between D and E is exactly the bias ε of f . We are interested in the
statistical difference between Dl and El.
For a universal hash function f that maps a distribution of min-entropy h to {0, 1}w , the bias is
roughly ε = 2(−h+w)/2. As shown in [17], if l < 1/ε (which is reasonable to assume here), statistical
difference between Dl and El is roughly at least
√
lε.
Hence, the approach based on public hash functions results in statistical insecurity of about√
l2(−h+w)/2.
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